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Abstract
In 2015, theWestminster UK government introduced a Modern Slavery Act described by its proponents as ‘world-leading’.
This description was challenged at the time both inside and outside the UK. Two years on, it is possible to make a prelimi-
nary assessment of progress with the Act and its two counterparts in Scotland and Northern Ireland.1 This article reviews
the origins of discussions about modern slavery in the UK, describes the process leading to the passage of the Modern
Slavery Act(s) and attempts an early evaluation of their effectiveness. It concludes that much remains to be done to ensure
that they achieve their goal of abolishing modern slavery in the UK.
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1. Introduction
This article attempts an early assessment of the provi-
sions of the UK Modern Slavery Act, enacted in 2015. It
provides a necessarily brief historical and global context
to this Act supporting the argument that, contra to the
beliefs of many during much of the period since the two
UK anti-slavery Acts of the early 19th century, slavery
never really disappeared but remained as a potentially
significant policy and political issue both outside the UK
and its links to goods and services consumed within the
UK,2 and, more latterly, within the UK itself. It examines
the development of the Act itself and the significant role
that was played by NGOs in lobbying for it and shaping
its form, and concludes by pointing to a range of policy
and practice issues which have yet to be resolved. Some
of these are being addressed but others, particular those
which have an apparent link to wider debates about im-
migration, appear to be unlikely to be resolved in the
near future.
2. Context: The UK’s New Anti-Slavery Initiative
On March 26, 2015, the British Parliament enacted the
Modern Slavery Bill, described both by lead-Parliament-
arian Home Secretary (now PrimeMinister) TheresaMay
and her successor as Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, as
‘world-leading’. This claim, reminiscent of claims made
for William Wilberforce’s First Act of 1807, seemed hy-
perbolic, given that several European countries—such as
Finland and the Netherlands, prompted by the Palermo
Protocol—had already introduced many key elements
of state anti-slavery law including Anti-Slavery Rappor-
teurs. The final form of the Act indeed left most active
NGOs—which had been key policy actors in the original
lobbying for the Act and in terms of its final shape3—and
1 This article focuses largely on the Modern Slavery Act for England and Wales although some observations are made in the final substantive section on
the contrast between this Act and its counterparts in Northern Ireland and Scotland for which separate comprehensive assessments would be useful.
2 Which became highly significant in the debates about Clause 54 of the Act concerning private company supply chains.
3 It is interesting to note that NGO-sponsored research and evaluation (sometimes in collaboration with individual academically-based researchers) was
far more significant in shaping the political and policy debates around modern slavery leading up to the passage of the Act, than academic research; it
is only in the past two to three years that a reasonable volume of academically-based research has begun to emerge.
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many Parliamentarians disappointed at the exclusion or
watering-down of key clauses (see final section below),
although there is no doubt that it has placed the issue of
modern slavery firmly on the British political agenda, pro-
viding important leverage for campaigners in the years
to come. This article, two years on from its passage, at-
tempts an early evaluation of progress. It is based on
careful monitoring of the progress of the Act, from be-
fore its inception, including extensive involvement with
key organisations lobbying for change, a reading of key
documentation and from feedback from ongoing work
with a national network of organisations involving in anti-
slavery work, which participated in a total of eleven na-
tional seminars examining aspects of the Act.4
3. Modern Slavery in Historical and Global Contexts
Placing discussion about modern slavery in a wider
context—making links between the history of slavery
and slavery today—emphasises that modern slavery is
not a historically isolated phenomenon. It is a contem-
porary manifestation of human relations, driven by eco-
nomic avarice and legitimised by racism. After the global
arms and drugs trades, modern slavery is estimated now
to be the third largest illicit trade in the world, valued at
at least $32 billion per year (Bales, 2007). Whilst slavery
in the past has been associated with the spoils of war
or with the industrialised trade of the Transatlantic slave
trade, human trafficking for sexual and labour exploita-
tion and forced labour now are associated with migra-
tion. This is driven in most cases less by the explicit pres-
sure of war (although that is clearly happening today as
in Syria where many migrant adults and children seeking
refuge are at serious risk of ending up in the hands of
people traffickers) but by the less obvious pressures of
poverty, poor attention to human rights, lack of basic ed-
ucation, and economic and demographic dislocation.
The conditions driving people to migrate and to be
trafficked are described in detail in a series of vignettes in
Gupta (2007). The impact of globalisation of labour mar-
kets is also substantial; essentially, trafficking for sexual
purposes reverses the dynamic where those owning cap-
ital (sex tourists) move to labour (those offering sexual
services, e.g., in South East Asia) to the converse, where
labour is now moved to meet the demands of capital
on the latter’s own territory. Moldova is a typical exam-
ple; one seventh of the population is estimated to have
emigrated during a few years in the early 21st century.
In 3 years, 1131 Moldovan victims of child trafficking
were identified.
Though the slave trades were legally abolished by all
European powers by the end of the 19th century, slav-
ery persisted. In the 200 years since the 1807 British
abolition, slavery has taken many forms, each of which
has impacted on present-day demographical and polit-
ical realities. Africans were transported to the present-
day Gulf area; within Central and West Africa, enslave-
ment of African by African or Arab continued, the cap-
ture of slaves often accompanied by wars of religious
conquest. Thirty percent of this African population re-
mained enslaved at the beginning of the 20th century.
In the 1960s, more than 200,000 adult slaves remained
in former French colonies, their descendants still present
as familial slaves in the Sahel (Quirk, 2009).
At the beginning of the 20th century, there were
still up to 2.5 million slaves in British-controlled North-
ern Nigeria; slavery was common both in the Muscovy
and Ottoman empires.5 Slaves remaining in hundreds of
thousands within the Arabian peninsula until the 1960s
have nowbeen replaced bymigrants from countries such
as India, the Philippines and Malaysia, many of them
working effectively as slaves—in construction, as nan-
nies, nurses and cleaners, women’s economic contribu-
tion often associated with a requirement to perform sex-
ual acts, in conditions so extreme that acts of suicide are
not unusual.
Slavery was formally abolished in India in 1843, but
most slaveswere transformed overnight into debt bonds-
men. Here, there remains the largest single concentra-
tion of slaves with tens of millions of adults and chil-
dren enslaved in debt bondage, particularly in agricul-
tural work, further instance of the links between histor-
ical and contemporary worlds of slavery. Forced labour
(including prostitution) remained a familiar part of the
colonial landscape throughout the early 20th century,
most appallingly in the Congo’s genocidal landscape of
the Congo (Hochschild, 2006).
Although most countries have now formally made
slavery illegal, slaves—including many millions of
children—continue to be found in many Asian and Latin
American countries in a variety of more modern indus-
tries including brick-making, fish processing, mining, car-
pet production, charcoal burning, gem-making and the
production of fireworks, alongside girls trafficked from
neighbouring countries into sexual slavery (Craig, 2009).
Although slavery is usually hidden, difficulties in abolish-
ing it in many countries are also accentuated, despite
laws, by complicity between slave-masters and the state
in maintaining it.
This brief historical review suggests that it is wrong
to see modern slavery as isolated from its previous
manifestations; many of the commodities historically
associated with slavery indeed continue to be so. Al-
though, with the emergence of international legislation
from the early 20th century (Craig, Gaus, Wilkinson, Skri-
vankova, & McQuade, 2007), pressure to end slavery
has grown, legal instruments and international political
pressure failed to abolish it. Slavery changes its forms
4 The first six seminars, which ran from 2013–2015, were funded by the ESRC; the second five, running from 2015–2016, by a grant from the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation. The conclusions drawn from this work are entirely those of the present author. Some of the findings of the ESRC seminars were
published in a report (Craig, Balch, Geddes, Scott, & Strauss, 2014).
5 Much of the specific data in this section draws on Quirk (2009) to whom I am indebted.
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to reflect an industrialised and increasingly globalised
world where the migration of labour—almost half of it
female6—to new, strange contexts makes it more vulner-
able to enslavement.
Ironically, comprehensive data—which, during the
period when slavery was legal, diligently recorded and
widely available—is now, in a context of illegality, far
less accessible. Estimates of numbers and types of slaves
in any country thus come with a health warning as to
their understated nature. The International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO, n.d.) estimates there may be 211 mil-
lion children aged 5–14 engaged in economic activity,
many of them trafficked, most of them working in haz-
ardous situations, and at least 8.4 million subjected to
the ‘worst forms of child labour’. They are concentrated
in the Asia-Pacific region, producing many goods which
go worldwide, most of all again to the consumermarkets
of ‘developed’ countries. Estimates of adults involved in
slavery worldwide range from 12 million to 40 million—
substantially larger than those involved throughout the
transatlantic slave trade.
Modern slavery worldwide takes many forms, includ-
ing chattel slavery, forced labour, debt bondage, serf-
dom, forced marriage, trafficking of adults and children,
child soldiers, domestic servitude (Kalayaan, 2008), the
severe economic exploitation of children and organ har-
vesting;7 many of them exist now within the UK or in
other countries linked to the UK through the supply
of goods and services. More recent manifestations in
the UK include large-scale farming of cannabis plants by
young Vietnamese boys, imprisoned in suburban houses;
and the use of children and adults, by, predominantly,
Eastern European gangs, to beg, pickpocket or shoplift.8
The most common forms of modern slavery in the
UK are of forced labour and human trafficking for sex-
ual purposes (Craig et al., 2007). The most recent esti-
mate of those in forms of modern slavery in the UK is
10,000–13,000 (Bales, Hesketh, & Silverman, 2015) al-
though many commentators, based for example on the
numbers of those already passing through the National
Referral Mechanism (NRM, the formal system for logging
victims of modern slavery), suggest this maybe a serious
underestimate. In 2014, around 3000 people were offi-
cially recorded by the NRM;9 the numbers of those re-
ferred for sexual and labour exploitation were roughly
equal, together accounting for more than 80% of the to-
tal, although, as in many European countries, the num-
bers of those recorded for labour exploitation was grow-
ing much more rapidly—the consequence in part of the
steady deregulation of the UK labourmarket10 (Standing,
2011; Waite, Craig, Lewis, & Skrivankova, 2015, passim,
but especially the editorial introduction).
Early discussion ofmodern slaverywithin theUK (and
elsewhere) focused almost exclusively on the issue of
human trafficking for sexual purposes. The US Depart-
ment of State estimated that at least 800,000 people
are trafficked annually across borders worldwide, most
of them women and children for sexual purposes, and
not including people trafficked within countries (UNICEF,
2005). This may have been a modest estimate as it is
believed that more than 500,000 are trafficked into Eu-
rope annually and the UN believes that 1.2 million chil-
drenmay be trafficked annually, internally and externally
(UNICEF, 2006a). Literature on trafficking into and within
the UK began to emerge from 1995 onwards. Parliament
reflected this growing awareness by establishing an All
Party Parliamentary Group on Trafficking although the
British government was reluctant initially to endorse all
aspects of the Palermo Protocol, the legal instrument
established by the United Nations in 2000 to ‘prevent,
suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially
women and children’, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, and
followed in 2005 by the Council of Europe Convention on
Trafficking in Human Beings.
Questions in the UK Parliament revealed consider-
able ignorance of trafficking’s scope and scale. Estimates
of those involved were very vague11 and, as it later
turned out, based on better data (see above) hopelessly
undercounted the actual numbers involved. Much of
the early leadership in raising issues about trafficking of
adults and children came from prominent British NGOs.
UK policy concern began to be translated into legal in-
struments from 2002. From 2004, all forms of trafficking
weremade illegal through use of the Sexual Offences Act
2004 and the Immigration and AsylumAct 2004 although
two NGOs (Liberty and Anti-Slavery International) later
managed successfully to insert a clause regarding the
criminalisation of forced labour as a stand-alone offence
within the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009. Until then,
forced labour could not be prosecuted in the UK unless
shown to be associated with human trafficking. It was
estimated in the mid-2000s that there were at any one
time about 5000 sexworkers in theUK,most of them traf-
6 About 52% of all migrants in the Global North and 43% in the Global South were female, see OECD (2013).
7 Organs such as livers and kidneys are removed under compulsion or duress of some kind (for example to settle cases of debt bondage), often in dan-
gerous contexts, for sale to wealthy people requiring transplants. Latest data available suggests and reported in GRETA (2016)’s monitoring report on
the UK suggested that there were eight cases in the UK in the past year.
8 See for example the various recent publications produced by Anti-Slavery International at https://www.antislavery.org
9 It is important to note that the NRM data includes indigenous children and adults who had been trafficked for various forms of modern slavery within
the UK.
10 The two New Labour former Prime Ministers, Blair and Brown, frequently celebrated the fact that the UK has an increasingly flexible labour market,
one now regarded as the most flexible labour market in Western Europe. Flexibility, however, appears to be a code for high levels of exploitation in-
cluding low wages, long hours, insecure contracts, poor working conditions and little trades union organisation. The UK Coalition government of 2010
and the Conservative government of 2015 have continued this trend.
11 One Parliamentary response from Harriet Harman when Solicitor General suggested that between 142 and 1420 women had been trafficked that year
into the UK (see Craig, 2015, for further discussion of early data).
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ficked into theUK, 75%of them female, and 30%aged un-
der 16 (UNICEF, 2006b) and that possibly 10,000 adults
had been trafficked into the UK by about 2008.
Although the National Criminal Intelligence Service
(NCIS, 2002) once suggested that there was no evidence
of large-scale trafficking into the UK, this view became
indefensible. Growing concern amongst NGOs largely
drove the introduction of legislation, the development of
a Home Office-led UK Action Plan on Trafficking and the
establishment, in 2007, of the police-led UK Human Traf-
ficking Centre (UKHTC), later incorporated into the Na-
tional Crime Agency (NCA), despite commentators argu-
ing that it was in existence for too short a period to assess
its effectiveness. The NCA is more policing-oriented and
less open to public scrutiny but itwas hoped that itwould
address the lack of effective communication between po-
lice, immigration and both statutory and voluntary social
services agencies in particular. Most commentators re-
mained critical of the government which appeared far
more concerned with tracking and capture of traffickers,
with immigration (e.g. the fear that illegal economic mi-
grants may abuse the provisions of the Convention) and
law enforcement, than with victims’ needs and rights.12
The European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is the overar-
ching policy and political framework covering the treat-
ment of refugees, the right to be free from torture, in-
humane or degrading treatment and the prohibition of
slavery and forced labour. Here, slavery has also been
interpreted to imply a ban on trafficking. The Council
of Europe, as well as requiring binding standards of hu-
man rights amongst member states, introduced a treaty
and the Palermo Protocol in 2000 which specifically ad-
dressed trafficking. This proposed measures to prevent
and combat trafficking and for better victim protection,
and established a monitoring body to review progress in
implementation—Ad Hoc Committee on Action against
trafficking in Human Beings, Council of Europe Conven-
tion (revised draft), 5 July 2004.13 However, although
most countries adopted laws to combat trafficking, and
there has been international cooperation andmovement
as a result of GRETA’swork, policy and practice responses
still vary quite widely between countries.14 The general
view of the UK position from those working in the field
was initially that legal frameworks were largely adequate
in principle but that policy and practice responses were
inadequate. For example, the TradesUnion Congress, the
peak trades union federation (TUC, 2006), pointed out
that trafficking victims in general appeared to have no
enforceable employment rights, possibly contributing to
the deaths of the 23 Chinese Morecambe Bay cockle-
pickers in 2003. This generally benign view changed.
As evidence ofmodern slavery grew, the government
was forced to act and to widen its concern to include
other forms of modern slavery than just trafficking for
sexual exploitation. The agreement to establish an Anti
Slavery Day in 2010, the result of a private member’s Bill
in Parliament, also helped to focus minds as did the pub-
lication of a series of reports outlining the scope and pos-
sible size of modern slavery in the UK (Centre for Social
Justice, 2013; Craig et al., 2007; Geddes, Craig, & Scott,
2013). It became clear that human trafficking, whether
for sexual or labour exploitation, was the tip of a much
larger modern slavery iceberg with the scale of modern
slavery being much larger than presumed, and its scope
much wider than had been understood, with new forms
of slavery practice becoming apparent.
Growing clamour around issues of modern slavery
within Parliament prompted largely by lobbying by a
number of prominent NGOs, research findings and me-
dia coverage finally led to the government agreeing to
publish a draft Modern Slavery Bill in December 2013.
Since its inception the Bill, now Act, and subsequent Par-
liamentary work, has become an important element of
the parliamentary portfolio of TheresaMay, whose spon-
sorship, whilst contradictory in the light of her other po-
litical positions,15 has helped to keep a high profile for
the issue. Certainly, it seems that May has wanted to
use her involvement with the origins and progress of the
Act to enable her to project an inclusive political stance
both in relation to her own party and to its broader pol-
icy agenda.
Having reviewed the historical, global and political
context to the debates on modern slavery in the UK, we
now move on to a discussion of the implementation of
Modern Slavery Act itself and an analysis of progress
to date.
4. The Modern Slavery Act
The early draft of the Bill was very weak, leading to sub-
stantial criticism from virtually every side, notwithstand-
ing claimsmade by government. Consequently, the draft
Bill went through an unusually prolonged, detailed and
highly critical process of scrutiny before reappearing
in a final form before Parliament in June 2014. At the
same time, many individuals, organisations, NGOs, re-
searchers and others, took the opportunity to promote
their own critiques. By the time the final Bill was pub-
lished, it had been very thoroughly examined, the gov-
12 See, for e.g., a Parliamentarywritten answer fromBaroness Scotland, HomeOfficeMinister of State, cited in HansardHouse of LordsNovember 2, 2006:
‘The government are examining how the Council of Europe’s Convention’s approach could best be harmonised with effective immigration controls’, a
comment which came back to haunt her as she was later found to be employing an irregular worker.
13 This body was overtaken by the work of GRETA (Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking), which has a key role in monitoring the implementation
of action against trafficking in EU member states.
14 GRETA is tasked by the Council of Europe to monitor the implementation of various conventions and protocols.
15 This apparent contradiction is in fact easily explained by considering her own personal political interests. In the event of a leadership election (which
came unexpectedly quickly following the Brexit vote which led to Cameron’s resignation), May—normally regarded as a candidate of the Right—might
well have calculated that she needed votes from the more liberal centre of the Conservative party to win a campaign.
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ernment’s claim that it was world-leading looking frag-
ile indeed.16
Despite growing awareness of the much wider scope
of modern slavery, most of the Bill still remained fo-
cused on the issue of human trafficking.17 Much early de-
bate focused on establishing the precisewording needed
to encompass all the possible offences which might be
involved, and how children in particular might be pro-
tected by its provisions.18 One key argument was about
what form the precise protection for children might take
with one suggested scheme, involving children being pro-
vided by the state with Advocates, to defend the best in-
terests of the child, being piloted by an NGO, Barnardos
(for an evaluation of this pilot see Kohli, Hynes, Connolly,
Thurnham, Westlake, & D’Arcy, 2016)
This was one of several initiatives the government,
unusually, took whilst the Bill was still being debated.
Another was to create a Modern Slavery Unit within
the Home Office; yet another to move departmental
responsibility for the Gangmasters’ Licensing Authority
(GLA),19 which scrutinised businesses for evidence of
forced labour and issues licences to agencies supplying
labour to companies, from the agricultural department
(DEFRA) to the Home Office; a fourth to review the NRM
in light of the scathing critique developed by many or-
ganisations (see Anti-Slavery International, n.d.); and a
fifth, to create the post of Anti-Slavery Commissioner.
This role, essentially claimed to be equivalent that of a
National Rapporteur, was required by the Council of Eu-
rope to be an independent one but, although the Act al-
luded to an Independent Commissioner, it remains un-
clear that the Commissioner can work free from govern-
ment interference.20 The First Commissioner, Kevin Hy-
land, reports to the Home Secretary who can redact his
reports, rather than directly to Parliament.21 The post
was advertisedbeforebeing debated in Parliamentwhich
suggested that the government was determined to get
its own way on this issue. Whilst the issue of trafficking
remained very central to the Bill and thus to the Act, this
essentially focused almost entirely on trafficking for sex-
ual exploitation of adults and children (those defined by
the UK to be under 18). This limited the time available to
debate or legislate on other aspects of modern slavery.
During discussion of the Bill, the issue of traffick-
ing for labour exploitation, and of forced labour (which
can occur whether or not trafficking is involved) thus re-
ceived far less attention. The number of cases for forced
labour brought before the courts had remained very
low and very well-prepared cases of forced labour were
thrown out, or given lenient sentences by the judiciary
who had, it seemed, a very limited understanding of how
forced labour worked (The Spectator, 2014). One impor-
tant victory was won by lobbyists with the government
finally agreeing to include a clause requiring companies
to take some responsibility for exploring whether slav-
ery might be found in their supply chains.22 The Act in
its final form indicated a series of issues which compa-
nies with an annual turnover above a threshold of £36
million would be required to include in anti-slavery state-
ments on a website. Contrarily, the government failed to
respond to very strong and prolonged demands from in-
side and outside Parliament to protect overseas domes-
tic workers from the abuse they suffered at the hands of
wealthy employers.
There was also substantial pressure to extend the re-
mit (and thus the resources) of the Gangmasters Licens-
ing Authority from its early narrow focus. Initially the
GLA was only able effectively to investigate a small frac-
tion of possible forced labour cases (Wilkinson, Craig, &
Gaus, 2009). The Act required the government to com-
plete a thorough review of the scope of the GLA within
a year of its enactment. This review was eventually sub-
sumed into a wider review of immigration and labour
market policy, thus confirming the myth in many minds
that modern slavery was really an immigration issue
rather than one of exploitation, and in October 2016
the GLA became the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse
Authority (GLAA). Although the government conceded
that the GLAA should have a remit which effectively cov-
ered the whole of the labour market including a num-
ber of industrial sectors which had begun to be of con-
cern toNGOs, trades unionists andothers (such as leisure
and hospitality, construction, social care), and some ad-
ditional quasi-policing powers, the GLAA has been given
nowhere near the kinds of resources it needs commen-
surate with these responsibilities.
16 Most significantly, a joint committee of the House of Commons and House of Lords engaged in pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, again informed by
lobbying and briefings from many NGOs and some academics. The government response to this scrutiny paper—see UK Government (2014)—outlines
many of the ways in which the government accepted much of the Committee’s critique, including around issues such as, for e.g., the statutory defence
for victims, the scope of offences, the role of the Anti-Slavery Commissioner, and the nature of preventionmechanisms such as Trafficking Prevention Or-
ders. Other specific issues such as the supply chains clause—Clause 54—were inserted at a later date as a result of specific campaigns for their inclusion.
17 This was rather more the case in Scotland where the Scottish government promoted a separate Bill to a more leisurely timetable and even more so in
Northern Ireland where an anti-trafficking Bill was enacted in a manner which led many to question the motives of the private member (Lord Morrow)
who sponsored it, much of the Act being given over to discussion of a law criminalising the payment of money for sex rather than trafficking per se.
18 This is important as the UK judiciary remained—some would argue still remains—largely very ill-informed about the nature of modern slavery and
has often either failed to recognise the seriousness of offences, or regarded victims of trafficking or forced labour as criminals. The Modern Slavery Act
committed to recognising victims as just that.
19 The GLA was established after the Morecambe Bay tragedy and initially concentrated on agriculturally-related sectors.
20 GRETA’s monitoring report on the UK anti-slavery strategy notes that the Anti-Slavery Commissioner ‘falls far short of that of a National Rapporteur’
and that the UK authorities should ‘examine the possibility of establishing an independent rapporteur.’ (2016, p. 11)
21 The Commissioner’s first report was published in October 2016, see www.antislaverycommissioner.gsi.gov.uk
22 See the report by Allain, Crane, LeBaron and Behbahani (2013) on this issue. Perhaps surprisingly, and certainly wrongfooting the government, some
big businesses (including, for example, supermarkets and hotels) supported further regulation, arguing that unscrupulous companies, using forced
labour, would be able to cut prices, thus taking greater market shares from what they argued were more responsible companies.
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The final debates took place in the week running up
to the point at which Parliament was to be suspended
for the period of the 2015 General Election. This enabled
the government to drive through clauses to which op-
position parties were hostile: running the debates right
up to the deadline (literally to the day when Parliament
ended) provided the government with the opportunity
effectively to say ‘you can have half a Bill or no Bill’. In
the event, opposition parties in the Lords and Commons
both settled for ‘half a Bill’: given that it had all-party sup-
port in general, no-one was prepared to prevent it from
being enacted.
The final form of the Act(s) thus reflected a substan-
tial amount of unfinished business, some of it explicit
as noted above, some of it implicit or contested. It is
arguable that these failings closely reflect the unwilling-
ness of government to act on much of the strong and
concerted advice offered in the period leading up to and
during the passage of the Bill.23 Clearly the fact that the
Acts are now part of the legislative and policy landscape
is a great advance: this has not only put the issue firmly
on the public and policy agendas, but given a substan-
tial boost to those who have been arguing the case for
action for many years, and provided a range of poten-
tial tools for the differing organisations (whether con-
cerned with criminal justice, victim support, social care,
advocacy and advice or ethical trading) to up their game.
As a result the number of prosecutions has increased
(289 prosecutions were brought in 2015 and 113 con-
victions obtained) (Inter-DepartmentalMinisterial Group
onModern Slavery, 2016), although perhaps not asmany
as might have been hoped given the scale of the prob-
lem, and some sentences have been regarded as derisory
given the seriousness of the offences. Additionally, most
(but not all) police forces have begun to create mod-
ern slavery units which, with the improvements in some
data collection, have helped them to focus more clearly
on modern slavery as a defined criminal offence and in
some parts of the country they have taken the lead in cre-
ating multi-agency modern slavery partnerships to coor-
dinate local work.
Many have argued that, despite these gains, the Act’s
provisions represent a missed opportunity in many ways.
In the final section below we examine some of these
outstanding issues, by reviewing progress to date and
assessing claims made by the UK government for it to
be a world-leading initiative. We do so under a num-
ber of key headings below. There are also cross-cutting
issues which will not be discussed below, a prominent
one of which is probably the question of training (see,
for e.g., Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, 2015;
The Passage, n.d.). It is quite clear from a wide range
of reports that there is no group of concerned profes-
sional, whether it be police, judiciary, medical practi-
tioners, NGOs, care workers, children’s service providers
where the level and quality of training for identifying
and supporting victims of modern slavery, and of know-
ing how to progress their cases, can be regarded as ade-
quate. This is a huge task requiring input from all agen-
cies involved.
In discussing possible changes to the Act over the
next few years, it is also important to acknowledge the
current political and policy context within the UK. Many
commentators have suggested that the significant spike
in race hate crimes following the Brexit vote of June 2016
not only drove many of those who voted to leave the EU
but also reflected themore general antipathy to immigra-
tion and specifically to migrant workers which has been
growing for some time (see, for e.g., Institute of Race Re-
lations, 2016). It seems hardly a coincidence then that re-
cent changes in the form of the Gangmaster’s Licensing
Authority (see below)whichwere claimed to address the
issue of severe labour exploitation were introduced in an
Immigration Act in late 2016 (and see below).24
5. What Remains to Be Done?
5.1. Three Acts or One?
We commented above that in parallel with the West-
minster legislation, separate legislation was introduced
in both Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Scottish leg-
islation appeared in many respects rather weaker than
that of Westminster, and that in Northern Ireland even
more narrowly conceived. Criticisms of the situation at
the time focused mainly on the fact that inconsistencies
between law, policy and practice might lead to some ar-
eas becomingmore attractive to traffickers and gangmas-
ters. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner (IASC)
has made some attempts to bridge these gaps and has
been given a UK role in respect of some provisions, but
important difficulties remain and an independent evalua-
tion of the legal framework across the UK as a whole has
pointed to very significant problems (Anti-Slavery Inter-
national, n.d.). In the event, however, it appears that the
legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland has turned
out to be more comprehensive and/or effective in cer-
tain areas such as protection of children (Anti-Trafficking
Monitoring Group [ATMG], 2016). These difficulties in-
clude the following:
• ‘Significant differences’ in a number of key areas
across the three jurisdictions, including around the
criminalisation of victims, and in statutory support
for adult victims (see below);
• A lack of anymonitoring facility to ensure coordina-
tion and calibration of the Acts’ progress, aswell as
to assess the effectiveness of specific provisions;
23 This could well be the subject of an entirely separate article focusing specifically on the policy process.
24 For commentary on the appointment of a new Director of Labour Market Enforcement, whose identity was announced in February 2017, see, for
example Weatherburn and Toft (2016) who examined the position in the UK in relation to the European Agency for Fundamental Rights report on the
severe labour exploitation of workers. This issue is also covered in various chapters within Waite et al. (2015).
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• The ambiguous wording of certain clauses or
words such as ‘travel’ and ‘duty to notify’;
• Significant differences in provision and timetable
in areas such as child guardianship.
The ATMG report also proposes that the IASC should be
given a central role in terms of collecting and analysing
data in order to identify specific gaps. At the time of writ-
ing, the IASC had just appointed a first research worker
although it is not clear what her role will be.
It is also worth noting that Wales is the only terri-
tory within the UK with what is claimed to be a com-
prehensive anti-slavery strategy coordinated from a sin-
gle point (see Welsh Government, n.d.). Core elements
of this strategy have been evaluated with the evaluators
reaching broadly positive conclusions about the effec-
tiveness of the key elements of the scheme, namely train-
ing provision and the support arrangements for identi-
fied victims of trafficking. The Wales strategy is also de-
veloping freestanding critiques of aspects of the Act and
guidance related to it (see, for e.g., Welsh Government,
2017, in relation to ethical practice in supply chains).
5.2. The role of the GLAA
It is obviously too early, months after its establishment
(and with formal structural changes only being imple-
mented in April 2017), to comment in detail on the im-
pact of the shift from theGLA to theGLAA although there
is a clear need for the issue of resources to be addressed.
The GLA’s remit, covering about 0.5 million workers in
the food-related industrial sectors, was being monitored
by a workforce at the GLA of 70 staff of which 40 were
field staff. The new all-encompassing GLAA has, techni-
cally a target of upwards of 30 million workers but is
only being offered resources for an additional 40 staff.
TheGLAA, like its predecessor theGLA, is intelligence-led.
Whether it will have the capacity to respond to claims
that a whole sector such as construction or social care
is infected by trafficking or by forced labour remains
a moot point. Construction is indeed a case in point
where the frequency of so-called self-employment may
mask an equally frequent occurrence of severe labour
exploitation. Other sectors where far-reaching investiga-
tions may be needed include food production and re-
tailing, shown by research to be one possible focus for
forced labour (Geddes et al., 2013), social care (Craig &
Clay, 2017) and fishing.
The Modern Slavery Act extends to the seas around
the British Isles within UK jurisdiction where cases of
deep sea trawlers crewed by enslaved foreign nation-
als have been identified: again, whether the GLAA has
the resources to pursue the issue thoroughly remains in
question. The other major change to the GLAA has been
in terms of institutional structures: although the GLAA
still has a (much-slimmed down) Board of Directors it ap-
pears that it may in practice be more closely account-
able to government through the new Director of Labour
Market Enforcement, thus less open to change driven
by external critiques. It will be some time before it is
clear what difference its new remit will make although,
given the generally high regard in which the GLA’s work
has been held to date by those active in this area, given
its limited resources, it would be a great shame if these
changes were to undermine its effectiveness.
5.3. Supply Chains
Clause 54 of the Modern Slavery Act, inserted relatively
late on in the Parliamentary process, required compa-
nies (which number around 12,000) with a turnover of
more than £36M to ensure that slavery practices were
not present in their supply chains, and to publish an-
nual modern slavery statements. A number of NGOs and
other organisations such as the Ethical Trading Initiative
and the British Institute of Human Rights have beenmon-
itoring compliance with this requirement. The Clause,
though welcome in terms of raising the profile of ‘hid-
den’ slavery within the goods and services found within
the British economy, is, as most commentators have ob-
served, very weak, with no formal legal sanctions other
than civil proceedings involving injunctions in the High
Court, unlikely to impact significantly on profitability. The
government’s view is that naming and shaming with its
impact on companies’ reputations might be adequate
to persuade companies to take effective action, a view
not widely shared. Early experience confirms feelings
that the provision is inadequate: few companies have
complied to date, most providing statements have failed
to meet the requirements of the Act; and many com-
panies remain ignorant of the Act’s provisions (see, for
e.g., Chartered Institute of Procurement & Supply, 2016).
Meanwhile, 71% of companies believe that there is slav-
ery in their supply chains (Fifty Eight, 2016). There re-
mains a clear case for toughening sanctions against com-
panies in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights (OHCHR, 2011). Additionally, the re-
quirement only applies at present to private companies:
a member of the House of Lords is currently pursuing
the possibility of a Private Members’ Bill which would ex-
tend the Acts’ requirements to the public sector many
parts, of which, such as hospital trusts and large local au-
thorities, have substantial procurement budgets.25 The
government has also declined to monitor compliance by
collating and publishing anti-slavery statements, a task
which might fall to an NGO. Several organisations have
begun to undertake this task26 (also see footnote 48) and
something of an industry has grown up of organisations
advising companies on how to comply with the terms of
Clause 54 (e.g., Walk Free Foundation, 2014).
25 HLBill 6, 56/2. See also House of Lords, In Focus LIF 2016/0035 Briefing Note.
26 See Research Briefing No 1 from the Modern Slavery Research Consortium, available on request from the present author.
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5.4. The NRM
As the Modern Slavery Act became operational, the
government committed to reviewing the National Re-
ferral Mechanism, the system by which the claims of
those alleging to be victims of modern slavery were
assessed (see National Crime Agency, n.d.). The NRM
had been widely criticised, including by a consortium of
NGOs which argued, inter alia, that the NRM was racist,
with those from countries outside the EEA (most of
whom were Black or from other minority ethnic groups)
standing only one quarter of the chance of having their
claims accepted as those from within the EU (most
of whom were white) (see Anti-Trafficking Monitoring
Group, 2014). The treatment of those also claiming asy-
lum was widely criticised, as confusing immigration sta-
tus with the status of potential slavery victim. The NRM
internal review undertake by the Home Office led to a
proposed simplification of structurewithmodern slavery
leads replacing the ‘First Responders’, whose job itwas to
refer identified possible victims of modern slavery into
the NRM via the NCA or UK Visas and Immigration. Pilot
projects for the new structure were established in the
West Yorkshire and South West England police forces to
test the new system and a full evaluation of their effec-
tiveness is awaited. However, although the government
claims that the new system makes it easier for non-First
responder NGOs to make referrals, this is disputed by
some NGOs and there appears to have been little evi-
dence of a greater volume of cases being processed. The
separation of the asylum/immigration and modern slav-
ery elements within the assessment process is needed to
ensure that alleged victims are not discouraged from re-
porting their experience for fear of being deported—and
possibly re-trafficking. At the time of writing it is unclear
whether the pilot system, which is not well-regarded in
many quarters, will be rolled out across the country or
amended again. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commis-
sioner (2016) has published a scathing criticism of the
NRM which he regards as not fit for purpose, cumber-
some and requiring radical change, in a letter to the
Home Office Minister (Independent Anti-Slavery Com-
missioner, 2017). In the letter he particularly criticises
the need for a two-stage process for validating claims
made by victims, other difficulties of accessing the NRM
and the failure to provide adequate support for victims.
The last point is particularly stressed in a report pro-
duced by a coalition of NGOs (Human Trafficking Foun-
dation, 2017).
5.5. Child Advocates
As noted, the government committed during parliamen-
tary debates to introducing a system of child advocates
whereby each child alleged to be the victim of trafficking
would have a unique Independent Child Trafficking Ad-
vocate responsible for protecting their interests vis-a-vis
other interests. This scheme was piloted by a childrens’
NGO, Barnardos, in 23 local authority areas and the
scheme independently evaluated (Kohli et al., 2016). Al-
though some successes were noted, the government re-
mained unconvinced by the effectiveness of the scheme
arguing that it had not made much difference in terms
of identifying or retaining trafficked children. The gov-
ernment accepted that much more needs to be done to
ensure the scheme’s effectiveness but has also acknowl-
edged that it should not wait for these to be developed
as it would put a number of children nowat risk in danger.
It has therefore agreed to invest in amodest child protec-
tion fund targeted on alleged victims of child trafficking,
particularly focusing on the reasons why they might go
missing and on children from high risk countries. It might
therefore be two years ormore before a system involving
an agreed form of advocate is established, and this may
still have inconsistencies across the UK.
5.6. Domestic Workers
Prior to 2010, domestic workers employed for example
by wealthy businesspeople or diplomats had a degree
of protection in that, although their visas were tied to
a specific employer, if evidence of abuse emerged (as
frequently occurred) the worker could change employer
without endangering their immigration status. The 2010
government changed this arrangement, and workers be-
came liable to deportation (and thus loss of income also)
if they tried to change employers (Mantouvalou, 2015).
The debate on this issue remained the most contested
to the last day of the Bill’s debates. The government con-
ceded an independent review of the visa arrangement
and committed itself to accepting the findings in full. In
the event, the Ewins review (UK Government, 2015), car-
ried out by a leading barrister, concluded that the visa ar-
rangement enhanced the prospects of exploitation. The
government has since backtracked and certainly not re-
turned to the pre-2010 position. Although the Anti Slav-
ery Commissioner intervened with the government to al-
low domestic workers on these visas to change employ-
ers during a six-month initial stay and those identified
through the NRM as victims of modern slavery to stay
for two years beyond that six months (IASC, 2016, p. 19),
this was not widely regarded as satisfying the govern-
ment’s promise to full implementation of the Ewins re-
view. GRETA’s (2016) monitoring report27 also noted that
the government had fallen short of its promise arguing
there was a need for inspections of private households
to be encouraged and that in particular that changes in
employers should be more clearly facilitated. Contracts
with those working for diplomats should, they felt, be
concluded with Embassy Missions rather than individual
diplomats to prevent the latter using diplomatic privilege
to escape prosecution.
27 See footnote 17.
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5.7. The Question of Labour Exploitation
As noted above, the issue of labour exploitation and traf-
ficking and forced labour in particular has remained fairly
marginal to UK debates about modern slavery, even af-
ter the passage of legislation. Although the new GLAA
has awide-ranging remit, its very limited resourcesmake
it unlikely that it can have much of an impact and the
role of the new director of Labour Market Enforcement
seems at least open to question. It is responsible to two
government departments, which will make reporting ar-
rangements difficult to manage and its gestation, as a
creation of new immigration legislation, suggests that its
role will be to focus much more on questions of irreg-
ular employment linked to irregular migration, than to
hunt down and prosecute the perpetrators of labour ex-
ploitation. This links to a wider criticism of the Act that
it remains at heart a criminal justice law linked strongly
to issues of migration status rather than one focussed
most strongly on victim support. In the view of GRETA,
much more needs to be done to strengthen the role of
the GLAA and parallel inspectorates including in the ar-
eas of resources, training and remit. However, trying to
stop labour exploitationwhilst all remaining government
policy encourages it represents the major contradiction
at the heart of the Act. It is hardly surprising then that
the Salvation Army, responsible for managing victim sup-
port during the 45-day reflection period, has reported a
four-fold rise in labour exploitation cases over the past
four years.
5.8. Data Collection and Analysis
Critical to the implementation of the Act in practice is
the question of effective collection and analysis of data.
We noted earlier that the formal government estimate
of the numbers of those in modern slavery at any one
time in the UK was as many as 13,000, a number gen-
erally thought to be an underestimate, and that approxi-
mately one quarter of that number (just over 3000) were
identified in the last full year as passing through theNRM.
There has been continuing controversy around the ques-
tion of ‘how many?’ and definitive answers will proba-
bly never be possible at national or international levels
given the hidden nature of the crime. However it is clear
that data collection, recording and analysis within the
UK is woefully deficient at present. It was only in April
2015 that a separate crime recording category of mod-
ern slavery was introduced into police data collection
processes and investigations make it clear that many po-
lice forces are still not exploiting the significance of this
innovation. Compared with the more than 3000 cases
known to the NRM, less than one third of that total were
logged in police records and an enquiry conducted on be-
half of the IASC discovered that some police forces had
no record of NRM referrals at all. Interestingly in North-
ern Ireland, which has just one police force, all modern
slavery crimes were recorded in the appropriate cate-
gory. The police lead on modern slavery has made data
recording a priority—as has the ATMG report mentioned
above—but there is clearly much to be done, linked to
the question of training. GRETA has noted that ‘there are
gaps in the collection of data on human trafficking, limit-
ing the possibility of analysing trends and adjusting poli-
cies’. This includes poor recording in other parts of the
criminal justice system and no systemic information on
possible child victims of trafficking going missing from
the care of local authorities.
5.9. Support for Victims of Modern Slavery
Current arrangements provide for a period of 45 days ‘re-
flection’ by alleged victims ofmodern slavery whilst their
cases move from a provisional acceptance of their claim
to a final agreement. Once formal acceptance of a claim
has been made, victims of modern slavery have a very
short period of time (typically two weeks) to make ar-
rangements for establishing themselves in the commu-
nity. With little knowledge of rights such as for housing
and benefits and very little support available in a formal
sense (althoughmany NGOs and churches have in partic-
ular stepped in to fill the gap), victims may be vulnerable
to poverty and isolation and possibly to re-trafficking if
their traffickers have not been identified and contained.
The issue of support services for victims has thus become
an important one. The Human Trafficking Foundation, a
prominent charity supported by an advisory network of
a hundred or more NGOS, has made this a strong focus
for their work, publishing a series of reports arguing for
improved care and support (Human Trafficking Founda-
tion, 2014, 2015, 2016). There has yet to be a coordi-
nated or strategic response to this issue and much of the
funding for this work has come from charities, leading
to something of a postcode lottery as to whether effec-
tive support is available. The government has also been
pressed to ensure that victims can be treatedwith a great
dealmore sensitivity by benefits offices than appears cur-
rently to be the case and this is now the subject of a
House of Commons enquiry.
6. Conclusions
This all adds up,28 if not exactly to a damning indict-
ment of the provisions of the Acts and progress since
their enactment, certainly to a huge agenda of necessary
and continuing political, structural and organisational
change. Underpinning it is, as noted, a widespread recog-
nition that the level of training for those now tasked
with identifying victims of modern slavery, responding
to their needs effectively and equitably, bringing perpe-
trators to justice and addressing the structural causes of
modern slavery involves a huge agenda of training all the
28 And there are many other issues which have been raised by service providers, researchers and others requiring attention but which are too numerous
to be listed here.
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way down from senior members of the judiciary, those
working in the criminal justice system, social services,
health and NGOworkers and the police. At present train-
ing is ad hoc, patchy and generally unequal to the task.29
Lobbying and campaigning around some of the more
significant of what are perceived to be weak or incom-
plete aspects of the Act continues at present and may
lead to further changes. To take a few examples from
the policy sphere, evidence is emerging about the extent
to which companies are responding to the supply chains
clause with a significant number of companies either
producing weak or ‘template’ antislavery statements or
no statements at all; this is likely to lead to calls for a
strengthening of the provision which is, at present, en-
tirely voluntary (see, for e.g., CLT envirolaw, 2017). There
is no evidence to date that, as the government hoped,
failure to act on this issue would affect the commer-
cial or public reputation of a company.30 The argument
about visa arrangements for domestic workers continues
with the government, having failed to keep its promise
to implement the Ewins review of the situation, seem-
ingly entrenched (and probably driven to be so by the
force of current anti-immigration debates) in its opposi-
tion to returning to the pre-2010 position. And the po-
sition in relation to the development of universal child
advocates remains unclear with government at present
unconvinced by the findings of the initial pilot scheme
but yet to develop a comprehensive response to what it
sees as its failings.
In terms of practice, the failure to develop effective
training across the Board has already been noted. The
evidence to date suggests that many organisations have
yet to fully understand or implement the provisions of
the Act; for example, a response to a parliamentary ques-
tion in February 2017 indicated that six police forces in
England and Wales had yet to identify a single victim
of modern slavery within their areas.31 Early research
on cannabis farming also suggests that the Crown Pros-
ecution Service and the police in some areas have yet
to understand the implications of the statutory defence
for victims of modern slavery in this area.32 Doubtless
other issues will emerge over the next few years as pol-
icy and practice encapsulated in the Act’s provisions are
worked through.
It was more than 200 years from the passage of
Wilberforce’s First Act to the passage of theModern Slav-
ery Act; based on this assessment, it seems more likely
that it will be littlemore than 2–3 years before this Act re-
turns to the statute book for significant revision. By that
time it is hoped that a thorough independent evaluation
of the Act may be possible.
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